Lisa Watters v. Clayton N. Querry, Jean C. Querry, Charles L. Querry, Elizabeth Hemingway, and David E. Hemingway : Affidavit of Plaintiff\u27S Counsel, Samuel King by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Lisa Watters v. Clayton N. Querry, Jean C. Querry,
Charles L. Querry, Elizabeth Hemingway, and
David E. Hemingway : Affidavit of Plaintiff 'S
Counsel, Samuel King
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
SAMUEL KING; Attorney for Plaintiff
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Watters v. Querry, No. 16897 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2167
SAMUEL KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
301 Gump & Ayers Bldg. 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
486-3751 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LISA WATTERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAYTON N. QUERRY, JEAN C. 
QUERRY, CHARLES L. QUERRY, 
ELIZABETH HEMINGWAY, and. 
DAVIDE. HEMINGWAY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS 
COUNTY OF S~.LT LAKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNSEL, SAMUEL KING 
Civil No. 234560 
COMES NOW Samuel King and being first duly sworn, de-
poses and says: 
1. During trial the court indicated to counsel that it 
would (1) not hear counsel concerning the instructions to be 
given the jury and (2) exceptions to the instructions would 
be taken after the jury was instructed and the judge had left 
the bench. 
2. The court stated that it had sufficient contention 
in the courtroom and had no wish, in addition, to "be harangued 
by counsel for an hour in chambex;s about the instructions."' 
The court acknowledged that counsel had the right to argue the 
instructions before they were given, but also stated that it 
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was strongly opposed to that procedure· and didn't want it 
done. The court also indicated that it intended essentially 
to follow the instructs given by Judge Snow at the first 
trial, although it characterized them as "poor." 
3. This affidavit is submitted as the matters occurred 
in chambers and were not reported. 
4. Notwithstanding the court's remarks, plaintiff's 
counsel insisted on a pre-instruction session in chambers. 
During that brief session, aspects of the instructions con-
cerning damages in the form of special verdict were discussed. 
The merits of liability had not been discussed when the court 
concluded the session. Plaintiff's counsel then paperclipped 
the key instructions from his reques_ts which were in possession 
of the court and asked the court to consider and incorporate 
them. 
5. When the court instructed the jury, it handed counsel 
its jury instructions. This was the first time counsel had 
seen, or been appraised of, .the instructions the court was 
actually submitting to the jury. These instructions did incor-
porate some of the instructions requested by both parties. 
6. After the jury was instructed, it was released for 
the afternoon to return the next morning for closing argument. 
During the interim, plaintiff's counsel read the instruc-
tions given by the court and realized that her instructions, 
17 and 17(a), on defendant Hemingway's liability had been 
omitted. Plaintiff's counsel, in the company of defendant's 
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counsel, Mr. Fishler, approached the court in chambers and 
stated to the court that apparently those instructions had 
been omitted by inadvertance, were vital and had to be inclu-
ded. Mr. Fishler responded that reading those instructions 
to the jury would give them a greater stress than the other 
instructions already given, and objected to them on that 
ground. Plaintiff's counsel, in an effort to compromise, 
proposed that the instructions simply be inserted in the 
sheaf of instructions which the jury would. receive at the 
close of argument, thus avoiding overstressing them by separ-
ate reading, but still putting them in the instructions so he 
could argue Hemingway's negligence and proximate cause from 
them. 
The court stated that it thought the matters were ade-
quately covered, agreed with Mr. Fishler on not overstressing 
and refused plaintiff's request. Neither the court nor Mr. 
Fishler indicated any disagreement with the accuracy or appro-
priateness of the proposed instructions. 
In refusing plaintiff's requested instruction 17 and 
17(a), the court also commented that these had not been given 
by Judge Snow in the first trial. Plaintiff's counsel acknow-
ledged that, but argued as the instructions were accurate and 
appropriate, whether they had been given before or not was 
immaterial and that they were needed to fully advise the jury. 
To this, the court replied negatively stating that it would 
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simply give the jury the instructions as they stood. 
/s/ Samuel King 
SAMUEL KING 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me January 23, 1980. 
/s/ Hazel Sykes 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
August 22, 1982 
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COURT'S INSTRUCTION 7 
The terms "negligence," "contributory negligence," 
"ordinary care," and "proximate cause," as used in these 
instructions, are defined as follows: 
A. "Negligence" means the failure to do what a reason-
ably prudent person would have done under the circumstances 
of the situation, or doing what such person under such exist-
ing circumstances would not have done. The essence of the 
·fault may lie in acting or omitting to act. The duty is 
dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion; 
B. "Contributory negligence" means that a person injured 
has prox,imately contributed to such injury by his want of 
ordinary care, so that except for such want of ordinary care 
on his part, the injury would not have resulted; 
c. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which a 
reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances. "Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reason-
able diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight 
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would 
be exercisec by a reasonably careful, prudent person; 
D. By "proximate cause" is meant that cause which in a 
natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, 
produced the injury and without which the injury would not 
have occurred. [Emphasis added] 
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COURT'S INSTRUCTION 17 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, 
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause--
the one that necessarily sets in operati'on the factors that 
accomplish the injury. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one proxi-
mate cause of injury, consisting of only one factor, one act, 
or the conduct of only one person. The the contrary, the 
acts and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently 
as the efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each 
·of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as 
a proximate cause and both may be held responsible. [Emphasis 
added] 
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COURT'S INSTRUCTION 19 
The law requires that no person shall turn a vehicle 
upon a public highway unless and until such movement can be 
made with reasonable safety. This does not mean, however, 
that the driver of a motor vehicle, before making a turn, 
I 
must know that there is no possibility of accident. It 
means that before starting to turn a vehicle and while mak-
ing the turn, the driver of the vehicle must use such pre-
caution as would satisfy a reasonably prudent person, acting 
under similar circumstances, that the turn could be made 
safely. 
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COURT'S INSTRUCTION 24 
You are instructed that a circumstance or act can reason-
ably be regarded as the effective factor in producing an injury 
and can be properly regarded as a proximate cause of it, even 
though later events which combine to cause the injury may also 
be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is some-
thing that might reasonably be expected to follow in the natural 
sequence of events. Thus, if you find that the actions of 
Elizabeth Hemingway were wrongful and that the collision of 
Clayton Querry's car with that of Lisa Watters was within that 
natural and continuous sequence of events which might reason-
ably be expected to follow the actions of Elizabeth Hemingway, 
and result in the injury to Lisa Watters, then you may find 
that the actions of Elizabeth Hemingway were a concurring 
proximate cause of the injury even though the later negligent 
act of Clayton Querry cooperated to cause it. 
But, if the actions of Clayton Querry in causing the 
collision were of such character as not reasonably to be 
expected to happen in the natural sequence of events started 
by the actions of Elizabeth Hemingway, then the acts of Clayton 
Querry are the independent intervening cause and, therefore, 
the sole proximate cause of the injury. [Emphasis added] 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Plaintiff claims that Elizabeth Hemingway was negligent 
because she obstructed a moving lane of traffic. Plaintiff 
claims that this negligence was of three types which are: (1) 
that she attempted an illegal left turn thereby blocking 
arterial traffic; (2) that she kept an improper lookout, so 
that she failed to clear the road as oncoming traffic approached; 
(3) that she failed to drive as a reasonable driver would have 
and should have under the existing circumstances. 
If you find that Elizabeth Heminway was negligent in one 
or more of the above particulars, and if you further find that 
such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, then 
you are to render verdict for plaintiff against Elizabeth 
Hemingway, and award plaintiff damages. If you do not so 
find, then you are to enter verdict in favor of Elizabeth 
Hemingway and against plaintiff. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17a 
Lookout. It is the duty of a driver to keep a reason-
able lookout for other traffic. If a driver causes a colli-
sion, which the driver could reasonably have averted due to 
the driver's not keeping a reasonable lookout, such is negli-
gence. 
Reasonable driving. A driver has a duty to drive safely, 
to avoid creating hazards, and to be aware of other traffic. 
If a driver fails to so drive as a reasonable driver would 
under the existing circumstances, such is negligence. 
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PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
The terms "negligence," "contributory negligence," 
"ordinary care," and "proximate cause," as used in these 
instructions, are defined as follows: 
A. "Negligence" meeans the failure to do what a reason-
ably prudent person would have done under the circumstances 
of the situation, or doing what such person under such exist-
ing circumstances would not have done. The essence of the 
fault may lie in acting or omitting to act. The duty is 
dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion. 
B. "Contributory negligence" means that a person injured 
has proximately contributed to such injury by his want of 
ordinary care, so that except for such want of ordinary care 
on his part, the injury would not have resulted; 
C. "Ordinary care" is that degree of care which a 
reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances. "Ordinary care" implies the exercise of reason-
able diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight 
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would 
be exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person; 
D. By "proximate cause" is meant that cause which in a 
natural, continuous sequence produced the injury and without 
with the injury would not have occurred. One or more parties 
may be joint participants in "proximate cause," either when 
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they are negligent at the same time, or when one is negligent, 
and as a direct consequence of that negligence, a dangerous 
condition exists which contributes to the happening of an acci-
dent by a later actor even though the later actor is also 
negligent. However, if the negligence of the later actor is 
so remote in terms of time and distance that such later actor 
could clearly have avoided the accident, after being legally 
charged with knowledge of the dangerous existing condition, 
then the actions of the later driver are the sole proximate 
cause of the accident. 
The distinction as to whether a later actor's negligence 
is the sole proximate cause of an accident, or whether it is 
a contributing proximate cause with that of one or more other 
drivers, is a factual distinction, the question of fact being 
whether the first actor's negligence created a dangerous con-
dition which in an unbroken chain of events produced an acci-
dent, or whether the negligent acts of the later driver or 
drivers occurred after there was sufficient time and space 
that,after they should have been aware of the dangerous exist-
ing condition, they had a clear opportunity to avoid it. 
The fact that the later driver was negligent, as Clayton 
Querry was here, is not determinative of this factual issue, 
because if a first actor creates a dangerous condition block-
ing traffic, it may b~ reasonably anticipated under the then 
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existing circumstances, that a following driver might be momen-
tarily inattentive or negligent and so happen into the acci-
dent before becoming alerted to the hazard. In that event, 
both drivers are guilty of contributing to proximate cause, 
and it will then be your duty, if you so find, to apportion 
the degree of fault between drivers. 
What is required for the acts of the later driver to be 
the sole proximate cause, is that the dangerous condition 
exist so long that the later driver, even though temporarily 
inattentive clearly knew or should have known of the danger, 
and had an opportunity to avoid the collision, yet failed to 
do so. Under those circumstances, the later driver would be 
the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
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